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BANKRUPTCY AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY
Thomas Jackson & David Skeel1
Introduction
To measure economic growth or recovery, one traditionally looks to metrics such
as the unemployment rate and the growth in GDP. And in terms of figuring out
institutional policies that will stimulate economic growth, the focus most often is on
policies that encourage investment, entrepreneurial enterprises, and reward risktaking with appropriate returns. Bankruptcy academics that we are, we tend to add
our own area of expertise to this stable— with the firm belief that thinking critically
about bankruptcy policy is an important element of any set of institutions designed to
speed economic recovery. In this paper, we outline the crucial role we believe
bankruptcy plays in advancing a robust economy, while also identifying several areas in
which we believe bankruptcy law—and practice—could be improved so as to enhance
bankruptcy’s role in economic growth, including its recovery from periods of recession.
Along the way, we suggest that a standard (and appropriate) baseline metric for
successful economic policies, namely employment, if carried outside its macro focus so
as to become an independent bankruptcy policy (as it often is), carries with it—usually
inadvertently— the potential to undermine bankruptcy’s key role in facilitating
economic growth.
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I

Bankruptcy and Economic Growth
We start by outlining our underlying proposition: An effective free

market/entrepreneurial economy depends on the existence of an effective bankruptcy
process. This is so because, while entrepreneurial innovation is usually conceived of in
terms of its successes—encouraging the flow of funds to new businesses and ideas
driven by the prospect of riches—the reality is that the prospect of large returns for
risk-taking also means the necessary potential for failure and loss. The correlation
between risk and return has a downside as well as an upside; thus, in anything
resembling a free-market/entrepreneurial economy, rewarding successful risk-taking
requires consequences to unsuccessful risk taking. Only in Lake Wobegon—or a society
where government bailouts are the norm—can all ventures succeed. The natural
opposition to bailout by those who have faith in the reward and punishment nature of
markets, whether of financial firms or industrial firms-or, indeed, of categories of
creditors—is borne from the realization that bailouts distort incentives, and interfere
with important market mechanisms for monitoring and disciplining firms.
Modern bankruptcy law primarily exists2 to help reduce the frictions that
otherwise would impede assets from moving to their highest-and-best use. Even those
who think this is too narrow a description of the purposes of bankruptcy law would
almost certainly agree that it is a, if not the, primary purpose. When a firm is
insolvent—when its liabilities exceed its assets at fair valuation—and the creditors
realize that not all of them will be paid in full, the creditors have incentives to demand

Here we speak of its role for firms and other commercial ventures. We set aside the separate
policy, applicable for human beings alone, of a “fresh start.”
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payment, or use available judicial procedures to seize assets, sooner rather than later.
“First-come, first-served” is a sensible policy for solvent firms, but it creates
externalities—a common pool problem—for insolvent firms.3 This use of individual
creditor remedies will result in the assets of a firm being pulled apart, and the firm
dismantled. But not all insolvent firms should be liquidated; there is a recognized
distinction between economic failure (a firm should be shuttered) and financial failure
(liabilities exceed assets). Sometimes, the assets are being used in their highest and
best use, and it would be inefficient to have creditors, lacking a coordination
mechanism, pull the firm apart, “saving” some creditors but imposing costs to the
creditors as a group—and society.
A simple example of the distinction between insolvency and financial failure is
perhaps helpful. When Johns Manville filed for bankruptcy in the early 1980s when it
appeared to be solidly solvent, in fact it was, on a deeper look, hopelessly insolvent.
The insolvency was due, in significant part, to crushing liability in tort for its
manufacture of asbestos, generally 20 to 40 years earlier—the time-frame for asbestosis
to reveal itself. It would take time for the tort creditors to manifest themselves, but it
was clear as of 1982 when it filed that—over time—Johns Manville simply could not
pay bank, trade, and tort creditors alike. By the 1980s, Johns Manville was no longer
manufacturing asbestos; it was a diversified building-supply company. If it did not have
the crushing tort liability based on products it produced in its past, there was every
reason to believe that one would want Johns Manville to continue doing just what it
This was first explored in a systematic fashion in Thomas Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857 (1982). While the author may regret the
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phrase “creditors’ bargain,” which has taken on a life of its own (often as used by critics), the central
point of bankruptcy as a response to externalities remains core.
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was doing—producing (non-asbestosis-based) building supplies. But as the realization
of this massive tort liability “overhang” spread, it would have made it impossible for
Johns Manville to continue in business without a collectivizing process such as
bankruptcy, as its consensual creditors would have demanded payment, so as to finish
ahead of the tort creditors (whose claims were often still latent or disputed), and new
lenders and suppliers would become increasingly leery of Johns Manville. Bankruptcy,
by collectivizing the creditors, stopping the use of individual creditor remedies, and
giving priority to post-bankruptcy creditors who dealt with Johns Manville, allowed the
thorny issues of “who got what” to be separated from the simpler issue of the “highest
and best” use of the assets—that is, continuing the business Johns Manville was in.4
There is a second frictional problem that bankruptcy is designed to respond to—
although, as we shall discuss, we believe it is less effective in terms of this goal. And
that is to shift control (and ownership) from the old equity owners to the creditors. In
an insolvent firm, the old equity owners are the wrong decision-makers. They have
every incentive to take extravagant risks—since the (small) possibility of enormous
returns becomes the only way in which the equity will see their interests return “to the
money.”5 In effect, at this time, they are playing with “other people’s money” for their
own potential benefit. Equity owners of an insolvent business have incentives not only
to string things along as long as possible, but also to increase the riskiness of the firm’s
This isn’t to say that accomplishing this was “simple.” Many of the asbestosis claimants were
unknown, and awkwardly fit with the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of a “claim” under Bankruptcy
Code § 105. See generally Mark Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1984);
Thomas Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 47-54 (Harv. U. Press 1986); David
Skeel, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America 217-21 (Princeton U. Press 2001).
5 This is different from “retain any value,” as—absent a control-shift mechanism that wipes equity
out—equity always has a positive value. This is a consequence of limited liability, which prevents
equity from ever being worth less than nothing. Thus, even the remotest upside possibility creates
positive value for equity.
4
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business. Bankruptcy responds to this concern by allowing the creditors to commence—
or force—a proceeding in which the transfer of residual ownership claims passes from
the equity to the creditors.6
Thus, bankruptcy plays a crucial role in undergirding the mobility of assets to
their highest and best use; it is an essential component of any market-based economic
system, and hence an important element to enhance policies for economic growth and
economic recovery. The question, which we turn to next, is whether bankruptcy’s
policies and practices are, by and large, sufficient, or whether there are ways in which
consideration should be given to tweaking bankruptcy, so as to strengthen bankruptcy’s
important role in facilitating economic growth.7 Although we will suggest a variety of
possible adjustments, overall U.S. bankruptcy law works quite well.
II

Bankruptcy Law and Practice: Two Problems and Some Suggested Remedial

Steps
At the start of the 21st century, American bankruptcy law is probably the best in
the world separating the consequences of insolvency from impeding the placement of
assets in their most productive use.8 Part of this is due to long experience with

As with collectivization, this is almost impossible to “write” as a contract term—as a form of an
“option” contract giving creditors equity control rights upon insolvency—although it might be more
plausible as a nonbankruptcy legal rule.
7 Our focus in this paper will be on larger firms—without defining precisely what we mean by that.
Our focus is not on sole proprietorships, or “mom & pop” stores, or the numerous restaurants that
come and go, although some of our ideas may be relevant to them as well. While we do not propose
reinstating the old, pre-1978 bankruptcy laws, which includes separate frameworks for small and
publicly held firms (Chapter XI for the former, Chapter X for the latter), there are ways in which
large, publicly-regulated (and oftentimes publicly-traded) companies should be thought of differently
from the very small businesses that line Main Street.
8 As one of us has noted, “[b]ankruptcy law in the United States is unique in the world. Perhaps
most startling to outsiders is that individuals and businesses in the United States do not seem to
6
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bankruptcy law, and the American system of adhering to the “rule of law,” meaning
that bankruptcy’s rules are known in advance and usually adhered to in reality. And
part of it in the consequence of a history of remarkable innovation—such as the equity
receivership for railroad reorganizations in the late 19th and early 20th Century—that
led us to use bankruptcy as a utilitarian tool, rather than as a device of shame and
punishment. What has emerged is a set of rules such as the automatic stay provisions
that impose an across the board standstill the moment a company files for bankruptcy;
provisions permitting the debtor to assume executory contracts—contracts with
material performance left on both sides—even if they are in default; reach-back rules
that permit the debtor to retrieve transfers that were made shortly before bankruptcy;
and priority rules, that all generally fit within the broader notion that bankruptcy law
has something important to say about the separation of financial failure from economic
failure. Perhaps less obvious, but no less important, in terms of bankruptcy’s
effectiveness, are its rules permitting a company’s existing managers to continue
running the business in bankruptcy9—an outgrowth of the same long-standing, and
non-punitive, notion that bankruptcy exists to rehabilitate (where it makes sense)
rather than punish; its generous terms for new financing (thus ensuring that
businesses that should continue, can continue);10 and its growing facilitation of marketbased interventions and valuations.11

view bankruptcy as the absolute last resort, as an outcome to be avoided at all costs.” David Skeel,
Debt’s Dominion, supra note 4, at 1.
9 Bankruptcy Code §§ 1104, 1107.
10 Bankruptcy Code § 364.
11 See infra, pp. 28-30.
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But, as good as it is—and despite significant improvements in bankruptcy’s
facilitation of the highest-and-best use of assets by largely separating the question of
what to do with assets from the question of who got the value of those assets—
bankruptcy law, and the shift of control that it brings, continues in our view to suffer
from at least two structural problems. First, as a general matter, bankruptcy is likely
to occur too late; earlier interventions would facilitate better achievement of its goals.
Second, bankruptcy law and practice has always faced a conflict—or at least a
tension—between making efficient asset decisions and preserving jobs (the latter being,
perhaps ironically, one of the key metrics of an economic recovery). We would like to
explore each problem, and offer some ways in which changes could be made so as to
reduce, although almost certainly not eliminate, both.
A

The Delayed Commencement of a Bankruptcy Case—and What to Do
About It

While bankruptcy permits both voluntary petitions—cases commenced by the
debtor—and involuntary petitions—cases commenced by three or more unsecured
creditors,12 it is well-recognized that the vast majority of reorganization cases for firms
are, in fact, commenced by the debtor with the voluntary filing of a petition under
Section 301.13 But this statistic almost certainly obscures the underlying dynamics.
This is a consequence of the layering of ownership rights to a firm and the reality that
decisions as to what to do with the assets of the firm are normally made by the equity
owners, through their agents, the managers. For the typically solvent firm, this
Bankruptcy Code §§ 301, 303.
Susan Block-Lieb, Why Creditors File So Few Involuntary Petitions and Why the Number is Not
Too Small, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. 803 (1991).
12
13
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location of decisionmaking rights is not particularly problematic. Equity is, at least for
a large range of actions, “playing with its own money,” in the sense that it reaps the
benefits of good decisions (as equity is entitled, in an unlimited fashion, to the upside
value of a firm), and—at least for a while—pays the price of bad decisions (as equity is
the first to have its value stripped as a firm declines in value). While imperfect, it is
enormously practical, and comes closest to replicating the decisions that an owner of
the assets without competing demands on them would make.14
This, however, changes as a firm begins a slide towards insolvency—towards a
world in which its assets are insufficient to pay all of the fixed (creditor) claims against
it. By the time of insolvency, equity is, in a very real sense, no longer playing with its
own money, but with the money of the creditors. At the moment of insolvency, the
creditors pay the price of bad decisions—any diminution in the value of the firm will
fall directly on them—while the benefit of good decisions redound to the equity—any
increase in the value of the firm goes directly to them. This changes the incentives of
decisionmaking in a major way.15 Rather than making decisions that have the highest
expected value (within the risk tolerance of a typical investor), equity is likely (a) to
increase risk in its investment decisions and (b) make risky decisions even if they don’t
have a similar expected value, risk aside. This is the natural incentive of a group that,
at this point, gains all the upside value of such decisions (as the residual owner) but
Sometimes referred to as a “sole owner.” See Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate
Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 104-109 (1984).
14

The incentives begin to change before the actual point of insolvency. As a firm slides towards
insolvency, it is more and more the case that the benefits go to equity while the burdens increasingly
fall on creditors. There is no momentary “light switch”—although identifying a moment prior to
insolvency the switch control is itself complicated. Precisely the ease of using “insolvency” as the
moment to switch control is at least a part of the problem of delay that we are examining in this
section of our paper.
15
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pays none of the price of declining values (as limited liability leaves equity in a
situation in which they can do no worse than lose the investment it has made)—but it is
increasingly the wrong incentive for the owners of the firm as a group. It distorts
decisionmaking away from the kind of decisions that would be made by a firm with a
single class of owners.
Even outside of bankruptcy, courts have recognized and wrestled with this
problem. Although directors of a corporation ordinarily owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders and the corporation, but not to creditors, their duties expand to include
creditors when a firm is insolvent.16 The precise contours of this duty, and the point at
which it is triggered, however, are unclear—courts speak of the “zone of insolvency” or
“vicinity of insolvency.” Courts in Delaware, the most important jurisdiction for
corporate law, have been reluctant to give creditors broad powers to enforce these
duties.17
One can see in bankruptcy a more decisive solution to this concern. Even though
the debtor (e.g., managers) may remain “in possession” in a Chapter 11
reorganization,18 two things change. First, the decisions of the debtor fall under
judicial scrutiny during the time of the bankruptcy proceeding itself. And, second, the
A Delaware court signaled that the directors of an insolvent or nearly insolvent corporation may
owe duties to creditors in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991). The Credit Lyonnais case prompted a flurry of
commentary on the nature and scope of the duty.
17 Most recently, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that creditors can sue derivatively—that is, on
behalf of the corporation—to enforce directors’ duties when a corporation is nearly insolvent, but
that they cannot enforce the duties directly. North American Catholic Educational Programming
Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d (Del. 2007).
18 Thus allowing those with the most knowledge about the debtor to continue (presumptively at
least) to run the ship. In this respect, this sharply differentiates U.S. bankruptcy law from that of
many other nations—and, indeed, from the “orderly liquidation authority” of Dodd-Frank for
financial institutions.
16
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end-point of the bankruptcy proceeding results in a reshuffling of the ownership claims
against the debtor’s assets. Under the absolute priority rule,19 the equity will lose its
interest in an insolvent company, and the creditors will become the new equity owners
of the firm.20 The faster the bankruptcy proceeding occurs, the less time there is for
strategic decisionmaking during the bankruptcy proceeding.21 Thus, bankruptcy can be
seen as a legal rule—or mechanism—for converting ownership from the old residual
owners (equity) to a new class of residual owners (the creditors).
The reason for a legal rule to accomplish this change of ownership is integrally
related to the other, well-recognized, major purpose behind bankruptcy law—the
substitution of a collective creditor collection mechanism for the nonbankruptcy “first-

In general, the absolute priority rule (or APR) provides that each senior class of claimants—
starting with secured creditors—get paid in full before any value can be distributed to the next
junior class of creditors. It is embodied in Bankruptcy Code §§ 725, 726, 1129(b)(2). There has
recently been a challenge to the absolute priority rule’s allocation of value between secured creditors
and unsecured creditors—arguing that it doesn’t replicate the nonbankruptcy priority rights of these
classes of creditors. See Anthony Casey, The Creditors’ Bargain and Option-Preservation Priority in
Chapter 11, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 759 (2011). The merits of that challenge is a story for another day.
Suffice it to say for present purposes that it acknowledges that it is proposing a change to existing
practices and tradition—and that our sense is that the case against the current understanding of the
operation of the absolute priority rule is not beyond challenge.
20 This vastly simplifies what can become a complex process—in terms of new sources of investment,
valuation issues, class-wide voting rights, and the like. These complications can shift value,
although—as we will discuss in a bit—increasingly shortened bankruptcy proceedings and reliance
on market-valuations push in the direction of (a) a shift in ownership and (b) a distribution based on
the absolute priority rule.
21 Management, once a bankruptcy proceeding has commenced, may have strong incentives to begin
to please the likely new equity owners of the firm—the old creditors. Moreover, the Bankruptcy
Code has procedures for ousting the “debtor in possession” upon creditor petition. Bankruptcy Code
§ 1104. Even so, the period “during” a bankruptcy proceeding almost certainly continues a conflict in
purposes between the prior equity owners and the creditors that appear in a number of ways. While
it may no longer have the same control that it did outside of bankruptcy, equity still have incentives
to use whatever mechanisms it has (a) to delay the final day of reckoning and (b) to push for riskier
asset-deployment decisions. Recent changes in reorganization practice suggest that, at least since
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, the balance of power has shifted towards creditors,
even within a debtor-in-possession model. For discussion of the shift and its significance, see
Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002);
David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy, 152 U.
Penn. L. Rev. 917 (2003).
19
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come, first-served” individualistic collection mechanism. The same concerns that are
seen in the individualistic creditor collection “race” upon insolvency—“I need to collect
sooner rather than later, because someone is going to be left holding the bag, and I
don’t want it to be me,” and the potential destruction of going concern value that can
result—exist with respect to the shift in control as well. While equity can act
collectively, unsecured creditors generally cannot. If there was a single unsecured
creditor, there would be no need for bankruptcy. But unsecured creditors are an
amalgamation of commercial lenders, trade creditors, tort claimants, workers (and
retirees) with health care claims, and other dispersed and uncoordinated individuals
and firms. Given that dispersion, there is no effective way to write, or implement, a set
of contractual provisions that either “collectivize” or “change ownership.” An option—or
legal requirement—to convert from a creditor claim to an equity ownership right (and
eliminating the old equity interests) is possible, but tricky. Without implementing a
bankruptcy-like judicial proceeding, it requires clear valuations, not just of assets but of
claims (many of which may be disputed, contingent, or unliquidated). Having the rule,
but then requiring these issues to be sorted out in court doesn’t end up sounding much
different to us than current bankruptcy practice.22

This isn’t to say that this alternative has been vigorously supported as an alternative to
bankruptcy. The foundational work here is Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable
Case for Chapter 11, 101 Yale L.J. 1043) (1992); Barry Adler, Financial and Political Theories of
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1993). Concerns about this approach were
early sounded by one of us. David Skeel, Markets, Courts, and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy
Theory, 1993 Wisc. L. Rev. 465. Interestingly, this debate has been “dusted off” in modern garb as
proposals for “opt-in” solutions for significant financial institutions post-2009 abound. See John
Coffee, Systemic Risk After Dodd Frank: Contingent Capital and the New Regulatory Strategies
Beyond Oversight, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (2011). Our preliminary concerns with this new garb are
expressed in Thomas Jackson & David Skeel, Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial Institutions, 2
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 435 (2012).
22
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Thus, bankruptcy supplies the “rule” (or rules) that the uncoordinated creditors
could not otherwise easily achieve—“collectivization” in terms of asset distribution to
the creditors and “ownership shift” from equity to creditors in terms of asset
determination. Both exist for what can be seen as a single goal: Effective
decisionmaking over the firm’s assets and future.23
But, as with the physics concept that the observation will affect the thing being
observed, this bankruptcy rule (or rules) itself changes behavior. While three or more
individual creditors have the right, under certain circumstances, to commence a
bankruptcy proceeding,24 there is the immediate question of whether individual
creditors perceive it as preferable to commence a case—in which they share in the
assets collectively—or to pursue their individual creditor remedies, get paid in full, and
depart. The fear that the incentives are clearly to “exit” rather than commence an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, leads to a well-known second-level bankruptcy
response, known as preference law. Pursuant to it, such actions by creditors are subject
to being unwound if done within 90 days of bankruptcy.25 This reduces, but does not
necessarily eliminate, the creditor’s incentive to attempt to exit rather than commence

One of us has argued that bankruptcy also has a liquidity-providing role. Kenneth Ayotte &
David Skeel, Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity-Provider, U. CHI. L. REV. (unpublished manuscript,
forthcoming 2013). We put this issue aside for the purposes of the current discussion.
24 Bankruptcy Code § 303(b)(1). Since 1978, the standard for an involuntary petition has been
demonstrating, upon challenge, that “the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such
debts become due,” Bankruptcy Code § 303(h)(1). The prior “balance sheet” insolvency test was
eliminated (as were “acts of bankruptcy”), on the ground that it was too ambiguous. The “generally
not paying” debts test, while perhaps more easily shown, arguably itself exacerbates the problem,
and an insolvent debtor, by liquidating assets, can—in theory—pay debts well into insolvency. (The
same was true in the case of Johns Manville, discussed earlier.) In many cases, as we discuss
shortly, however, the need to borrow money to continue to pay off creditors becomes the device that
tends to collapse the two standards.
25 Bankruptcy Code § 547. The reach-back period is one year if the creditor is an “insider” within the
meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 101(31).
23
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an involuntary case, as the creditor still “wins” if it collects its payment (or security
interest) and 90 days pass without a bankruptcy petition being filed. All preference law
does is return the debtor and the creditor to the status quo. It is like saying “if you cut
in line, and we catch you, we will return you to where you would have been had you not
cut in line.” It does not, itself, eliminate the incentive for creditors to prefer an asset
grab over the commencement of a bankruptcy case.26
And, at least observationally, involuntary petitions against firms are
significantly an exception, rather than the rule.27 This leaves voluntary petitions, and
the concern we have already noted, that equity have every reason not to pull the
bankruptcy trigger, as it becomes the triggering mechanism for them losing their right
to the upside value of the firm. So, creditors don’t seem to have an incentive to start a
bankruptcy proceeding. And equity doesn’t seem to have an incentive to start a
bankruptcy proceeding.
Given this state of affairs, then, why do we observe bankruptcy proceedings at
all? We suspect that the usual scenario, at least with large firms, is the insistence of

new creditors that equity (and management) file for bankruptcy as a condition of
receiving new credit. Because of the sharp division between pre-petition creditors and
post-petition creditors, a firm needing liquidity that is also facing insolvency (even if
there is a solid going concern underneath) is likely to be met with an insistence by new
lenders that it file for bankruptcy, as a condition of receiving the new funds (which, in

This is complicated by the introduction of real-world costs—both in terms of collecting in the first
instance and in terms of litigation expenses if the creditor wants to contest a preference assertion by
the debtor once a bankruptcy case commences.
27 See note 13, supra.
26
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bankruptcy, would be entitled to “administrative expense” priority—i.e., priority senior
to all pre-petition unsecured claimants).28 The question is whether this mechanism is
timely enough to get bankruptcy cases to commence at about the right time, rather
than too late—since, as we have shown, none of the other incentives are likely to lead to
timely bankruptcy proceedings.
We are skeptical that this triggering mechanism is effective in getting
bankruptcy cases to start on time. In part that is because the optimal time for
bankruptcy probably isn’t the moment of insolvency, but somewhat earlier—when
equity’s incentives begin to get distorted from those of a solvent residual owner in the
slide towards insolvency. In part that is because information flows from the debtor
tend to lag reality. By the time a potential new lender realizes that it should insist on a
bankruptcy filing as a condition of making a loan, it is likely that the firm should have
already been in bankruptcy.29
If this is so, then bankruptcy could be improved by getting cases to start even
somewhat earlier. The trick, as always, is how to accomplish this, without making the
cure worse than the disease. We think there is no silver bullet, but there are a series of
steps that are worth exploring.
The first is to pick up on one of the (few) good ideas that emerged out of the
Dodd-Frank Act’s regulations for significantly important financial institutions: Living

Bankruptcy Code § 364.
There is a robust legal debate about this. See Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business
Bankruptcy, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1199 (2005); Robert Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy
Reform on Investment Incentives, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1159 (1994); Barry Adler, A Re-Examination of
Near-Bankruptcy Investment Incentives, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 575 (1995); Barry Adler, Bankruptcy
and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 439 (1992).
28
29
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wills.30 At least for firms over a certain size, a requirement that the firm have, on file,
and subject to review and challenge, a document, regularly updated, specifying how a
bankruptcy proceeding would unfold, would have important benefits. Most
significantly, these procedures, spelled out in advance and known to creditors and
regulators, would remove some of the uncertainty about what would occur if and when
a bankruptcy case commences. The most obvious objection to the living will approach is
the added cost of creating and updating the resolution plan. Although this is a
legitimate concern, it is important to recognize that preparing a living will for even a
very large corporation would not be nearly as complex as for the systemically important
financial institutions that have recently prepared living wills as required by the DoddFrank Act. A living will requirement for some subset of the largest firms not only could
facilitate the bankruptcy case itself, but conceivably the reduction in uncertainty would
make the case more palatable to creditors, if not to the debtor itself. It would also
facilitate a potential role for the SEC or other regulators in terms of the commencement
of the case, an idea we introduce shortly.
The second, we believe, is to reintroduce the possibility of the filing of an
involuntary petition based on the debtor’s balance-sheet insolvency or unreasonably
small capital. That is, add to the existing “cash flow” test for involuntary bankruptcy, a
provision permitting the filing of an involuntary petition that can withstand challenge
based on “balance sheet” insolvency. The reasons for its removal—that balance sheet
insolvency is difficult to ascertain; that creditors will abuse their ability to file based on

The Dodd-Frank Act requires that every systemically important financial institution file a rapid
resolution plan indicating how it would respond to financial distress, including the steps it would
take to minimize the risk of systemic spillover effects. Dodd-Frank Act section 167(d).
30
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such a test—seem not to have passed the test of time. While balance sheet insolvency
may be difficult to ascertain, so, too, may be a standard of generally not paying debts as
they become due, particularly when the debtor may be selectively paying some (favored)
creditors while ignoring others.31 Moreover, at least for larger firms, the true problem
does not appear to be the possibility of abusive filings, but delayed filings. While
reintroduction of a balance sheet insolvency test will not, itself, significantly solve the
problem, it is at least a step in the right direction.32
The third, and related to the first two, would be to permit the SEC, or other
identified primary government regulator, to file an involuntary petition on the same
basis as creditors—and subject to the same right of the debtor to challenge the filing.33
This idea has been floated as a part of a proposed Chapter 14 for the nation’s largest
financial institutions, in terms of giving the FDIC the right to file involuntary petitions
under a balance sheet insolvency test,34 and we believe it deserves broader
consideration, precisely because the concerns identified in Chapter 14 are not
themselves limited solely to financial institutions. Moreover, involving the SEC (or
primary regulator) at the commencement of the bankruptcy case may provide it with a
To continue with the Johns Manville example: When there are latent tort creditors, it would be
possible to “generally pay debts as they become due” to existing, liquidated, creditors for quite some
time, even though the firm was hopelessly insolvent in a balance sheet sense.
32 If one wanted to proceed cautiously, one could limit invocation of this balance sheet insolvency test
to creditors holding, in the aggregate, more than five percent or $1 million in claims (or some such
similar numbers).
33 We recognize that there may be a certain irony in this suggestion. The great innovation of 1938’s
Chandler Act was the prominent role of the SEC in reorganizations under Chapter X—a role that
was largely repudiated in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. David Skeel, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 4,
at 119-123, 160-183. We do not anticipate the SEC having the same power to dictate the
reorganization process that it had under Chapter X; and unlike with Chapter X, the parties would
retain principal decision making authority.
34 “Bankruptcy Code Chapter 14: A Proposal,” February 2012 (Resolution Project sub-group of the
Working Group on Economic Policy at the Hoover Institution). In the interest of disclosure, both of
us are members of the Resolution Project and played a role in the drafting of the Chapter 14
proposal.
31
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role within the court-supervised process that will mitigate “side door” efforts by
government to intervene to bail the firm out or to save jobs later down the line—issues
that we take up in the next part of this paper.
Moving to perhaps somewhat more radical, or at least controversial, suggestions,
we believe it is worth considering—albeit with caution—a modest series of incentives
and penalties to nudge the primary players to commence a more timely bankruptcy
proceeding. Let us suggest three, although there are surely others.
(1)

Consider adding an incentive—a bounty—for the debtor—through its

equity decisionmakers—to file a bankruptcy proceeding rather than delay in the hopes
of striking gold. We are thinking of something that would preserve, in a successful
reorganization, a small portion of value—and hence upside—for the old equity holders.
For example, consider a regime in which equity would retain a percentage of the
difference in value between the going concern value of the assets (as determined by a
market-driven valuation process) and the piecemeal liquidation value of the assets,
with the size of the percentage determined inversely with respect to how insolvent the
firm was.35 Thus, for example, a firm that files at the tipping-point of insolvency—
when assets and liabilities are in equipoise—that successfully reorganizes might
allocate 10% of the difference between going-concern and liquidation value to equity,36
whereas a firm that files at a point when liabilities exceed assets by a significant
amount would not allocate any value to equity. This idea is, admittedly, somewhat
One of us proposed a similar strategy for encouraging timely initiation of bank insolvency
proceedings some years ago. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance
Insolvency Regulation, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 723 (1998).
36 The reason for the allocation is pragmatic, not principled. It is not based on any underlying sense
that the nonbankruptcy world should, for example, limit creditors to their liquidation values in any
form of reorganization.
35
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crude37 and subject to considerable measurement problems.38 But to the extent there is
thought to be a cost to the current system—late commencement of bankruptcy cases—
that causes a destruction in value, the question is whether such a bounty would
produce benefits that exceeded its easy-to-imagine costs.39 We think that, sensibly
designed, there is a plausible case that the answer to this is “yes.”
(2)

One could, in parallel fashion, consider a bounty for the actual creditors

who filed an involuntary petition that was either unchallenged or that withstood
challenge. Again, to avoid perverse incentives, the bounty would probably need to be
modest, but enough to encourage at least some offset to the natural inclination of
creditors to see little reason to do anything other than seeking payment (or security)
rather than the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding. For illustrative purposes,
we are thinking of something along the following lines: a payment of 105% of the
payment ultimately received by other unsecured creditors to the creditors who file an
involuntary petition, but in no case more than two percent of the aggregate payments
going to the class of unsecured creditors.40 This alternative has the added advantage of
avoiding the need to rely on a valuation made by the court.

For one example, to again pick on Johns Manville, the past tort liability, by the time it became
known, may have put Johns Manville completely under water. Even so, as the magnitude of the
emerging liability unfolded, a rule such as we discuss in text conceivably could have led to a
somewhat earlier bankruptcy filing.
38 Even with a going-concern sale of the business, which determines the going-concern value, who
determines the hypothetical liquidation value? We would lean towards a court-determined
liquidation value, led by a court-appointed valuation expert, but this admittedly reintroduces some of
the court-determined valuation issues that (intentionally) dominated early reorganizations under the
1978 Bankruptcy Code and that recent practices have tended to deviate from.
39 See, for example, Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 439
(1992)(arguing that permitting shareholders to recover in bankruptcy increases ex ante risk taking
incentives).
40 To ensure that creditors filing an involuntary petition don’t first receive partial payments, wait out
the preference period, and then commence an involuntary case, it would be possible to limit the
37
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(3)

As has been noted, other than the transaction costs of receiving a

preferential payment and the associated costs of needing to return the payment,
preference law’s deterrent effect is limited—or, at least, incomplete. It has been
observed before that it seems to be commonplace that a bankruptcy case is commenced
shortly after the running of the preference period on a large payment, and that this is
probably more than a coincidence.41 The creditor’s interests—particularly a creditor
with influence over the debtor—are (a) to receive payment and (b) delay bankruptcy
until 90 days have passed. While it makes no sense to penalize all preferences—too
many are innocent or inadvertent (well beyond the safe-harbor rules of Section 547)—it
would be possible to create a deterrent rule that attempted to separate the advertent
from the inadvertent preference. It would make considerable sense, we believe, to
consider adding a modest penalty—perhaps five or ten percent of the amount of the
preference received—for any creditor who receives a preference with “actual intent to
avoid an imminent bankruptcy proceeding.”42 While bright-line rules have a great deal
of virtue, particularly in terms of administrative simplicity and avoidance of wasted
litigation costs, the “actual intent” test appears elsewhere,43 while the incremental
penalty is small enough so as to make its invocation unusual except in the case of either

bounty payments to creditors who had not received a preferential payment within six months of the
commencement of the bankruptcy case. We tend to think this unnecessarily complicates things, and
the complementary adoption of our next proposal—placing a penalty on intentionally opt-out
preferences—would be sufficient.
41 Barry Adler, Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on Bankruptcy
353 (4th ed. 2007).
42 This might be coupled with an extended preference period for such preferences in the case of
significant lenders—or significant preferences—to get at the “big creditor [who] can twist the
debtor’s arm, bleed the debtor dry, and then prop it up for ninety-one days,” id., even though the
creditor isn’t formally an insider under Bankruptcy Code § 101(31).
43 E.g., Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(A); see also Bankruptcy Code § 550(b).
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large—or flagrant—violations. In addition, its presence is perhaps as valuable for its
“in terrorem” effects as for its actual ex post impact.
Finally—and before leaving the topic of improving bankruptcy’s role in
facilitating economic recovery and growth through improving ways to ensure that a
bankruptcy proceeding doesn’t commence too late—we should note a more general
issue. Both of us have written, together and separately, about concerns we have had
with the whole-sale exception of qualified financial contracts from bankruptcy’s
automatic stay and preference provisions.44 Among our objections is a belief that by
attempting to insulate counterparties—often the most sophisticated of entities involved
with a debtor—from the consequences of bankruptcy, these safe harbors have weakened
the incentives of some of the most effective monitors of the firm from doing precisely
that monitoring. Good monitoring carries positive externalities. It protects not just the
creditors doing the monitoring, but the broader group of creditors as well. And the
signal sent by a counterparty who bears costs in bankruptcy of efforts to withdraw from
the debtor or shore up its position, may be one of the most effective ways for other
creditors to realize that a bankruptcy proceeding is inevitable, and should be started
sooner rather than later.
Our point in mentioning this here is that the lesson isn’t just about
counterparties to qualified financial contracts, or the effects on monitoring of protecting
them from the consequences of bankruptcy. The point may be generalized. Rules that
These exclusions generally appear in Bankruptcy Code §§ 362(b)(7), (17), (27); 546(e) - (g), (j); 559562. Our concerns can be found in Darrell Duffie & David Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs and
Benefits of Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements, at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982095; David Skeel & Thomas Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the
New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 152 (2012).
44
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interfere with effective creditor monitoring, or the free-flow of visible information,
interfere with a positive externality that is one of the better ways to have creditors
understand what might be going on as a firm slides towards insolvency. Keeping those
mechanisms—and channels of information—open is, itself, one of the most effective
ways we know of to ensure that knowledge is disseminated and bankruptcy proceedings
commence on (or at least closer to on) time. One needs to think twice about ex ante
rules that protect particular creditors from bankruptcy’s impact, as well as from any
sense that there will be ex post bailouts or protections of particular creditors, which
have similar impacts on monitoring and the consequent dissemination of information to
the creditors as a group.
B

A Conflict of Goals: The Efficient Use of Assets vs. “Saving Jobs”

In our view, effectively addressing the two structural issues we have addressed—
the common pool problem and the optimal decisionmaker problem—is the most
important contribution bankruptcy can make to economic recovery, the focus of this
book. But it is also almost certainly the case that most people, looking at measures of
economic recovery, will pay particular—although, obviously, not exclusive—attention to
issues of job creation and employment levels. Appropriately so.
Why, then, have we not really focused on issues of jobs and employment? There
is a specific reason for that. Throwing in an explicit focus on jobs into bankruptcy, at
least as an independent policy (or one that takes on a life of its own), we believe, more
often than not, causes an unintended conflict with the issue of asset deployment that,
at least for firms, bankruptcy is so uniquely suited to address. While we believe the
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concern about jobs—and job preservation—is pervasive, and seems almost impossible to
keep out of bankruptcy at one level or another as an independent focus or policy, we
also think that heightened attention to its disruptive effects when used as an
independent focus of bankruptcy is at least a worthwhile, albeit partial, palliative. To
be sure, in the case of a successful reorganization, the two policies—economic efficiency
and job preservation (if not growth)—tend to merge. But where the economic decision
about what to do with a firm’s assets points to a possible liquidation, the two policies
tend to come into conflict.
We take seriously the issue of job creation—and the dislocations caused by job
termination—but think pressing this into bankruptcy as an independent policy along
asset deployment, asks too much of bankruptcy. The issue of jobs, if inconsistent with
the issue of asset-deployment, should generally be addressed transparently and
humanely through other vehicles. Bankruptcy’s solutions for the use of assets are
necessarily “micro,” whereas too often the focus on “jobs” in bankruptcy has
unintended, and indeed perverse, “macro” implications. In this part of the paper, we
will attempt to explain why this is so—but only after a short primer on the history of
bankruptcy reorganization and a concern about jobs.
1. Bankruptcy and Jobs: A Brief Primer
Bankruptcy’s core statutory rules—again, when the focus is on firms—are
concerned with requiring creditors to work for the collective benefit of all, rather than
focus on saving their own hides, and then distributing the results according to the
principle of absolute priority, which means senior creditors get paid in full out of assets
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to which they have senior claims prior to junior classes receiving anything on account of
their claims or interests.45 This can be seen, perhaps most clearly, in the distribution
rules in Chapter 7, the so-called “liquidation” chapter. Rules that apply to all
bankruptcy proceedings—reorganizations and liquidations alike—include basic
“collectivizing” rules. Thus, as we noted earlier, the automatic stay stops individual
creditor collection efforts.46 Incomplete—executory—contracts that potentially have a
net value to the debtor are treated like assets, and thus counterparties are prohibited
from terminating the contract.47 Preferences—eve-of-bankruptcy payments to
(particularly) unsecured creditors are treated as efforts to opt-out of bankruptcy, in
conflict with the collectivization rule, and are thus unwound if done within 90 days of
bankruptcy (or one year in the case where the recipient is an “insider” with presumably
better knowledge of a forthcoming bankruptcy).48 And the assets that have been
“collectivized” are then sold (prototypically, in piecemeal fashion) and the proceeds are
distributed to the claimants according to the absolute priority rule.49
But the genius of bankruptcy’s rules doesn’t shine in the prototypical liquidation
under Chapter 7. The assets are liquidated—which would have occurred outside of
bankruptcy as well. There is a more even distribution among creditors of the value of
those assets—the basis of the now almost timeless phrase “equality is equity”—than
would have occurred outside of bankruptcy, but the systemic economic benefits of that
are not particularly clear.
As we saw in the prior part, related to this is a shift in decisionmaking from equity to creditors.
For present purposes, we can safely set this related policy aside.
46 Bankruptcy Code § 362.
47 Bankruptcy Code § 365.
48 Bankruptcy Code §§ 547 (preferences); 101(31) (insider).
49 Bankruptcy Code §§ 725, 726.
45
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Where bankruptcy proves its weight in gold is in the reorganization arena.
Here, the “collectivizing” rules have real consequence. If the assets are worth more
together, they can be kept together. Unlike the prototypical Chapter 7, where the issue
is inter-class distribution, but the asset use inside and outside of bankruptcy is more or
less the same, Chapter 11 rather dramatically changes the asset use outcome from
outside of bankruptcy to inside of bankruptcy. It is the ability (but not the
requirement) to keep the assets together that makes bankruptcy an essential tool in a
free-market/entrepreneurial economy, concerned with moving assets to their highestand-best use. In theory, these assets (kept together) could be allocated exactly the
same way as they were in Chapter 7, strictly according to the principles of the absolute
priority rule.
When the economic decision is to keep the firm together as a going concern, there
is at most a muted conflict with the interests of workers (or the surrounding
community). The (existing) workers get what they want—or, at least, as much as they
could reasonably hope for under the circumstance. When reorganization “works”
because it keeps assets from being ripped apart, there is likely to be a large congruence
between the decision what to do with assets and the spill-over effects on workers and
others. But when a firm faces not only financial but economic failure—meaning that its
assets would be better deployed elsewhere than in the continuation of the firm—the
interests of creditors and the interests of (existing) workers almost certainly diverge. It
is here where the legal landscape created by the Bankruptcy Code matters in terms of
how it addresses this divergence in interests.

24

The framework of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, as originally conceived, assumed
assets would be sold in Chapter 7, the liquidation chapter, but presumptively
reorganized pursuant to a negotiated plan rather than sold in Chapter 11, the
reorganization chapter.50 If it was obvious that assets truly needed to be liquidated, the
procedures of Chapter 7 were optimal, and the plight of workers (or communities) got
little, if any, attention. But the incentives to use Chapter 11, and its negotiation
framework, even for firms that were unlikely to reorganize, were strong. As we have
already seen, almost all bankruptcies are (so-called) “voluntary,” and debtors have
enormous incentives to try to keep things going, if not outside of bankruptcy, then
inside of it.
Without a premise that assets would be sold, the structure of Chapter 11
necessarily built itself around issues of valuation, conflicts over valuation, and their
resolution. The solution written into the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 was an extended
period for the debtor (in possession, usually) to have to formulate and file a plan of
reorganization, and during such time no other party in interest could file a competing
plan.51 There was then an additional period to solicit acceptances and a vote on the
plan.52 Valuation disputes would be resolved by the bankruptcy judge.53 Individual
creditors would be protected by a “liquidation” standard;54 only a class of creditors could

Enough so that if a reorganization looked to be infeasible, the structure seemed to assume that the
case would be converted to Chapter 7. See Bankruptcy Code § 1112(b).
51 Bankruptcy Code § 1121(b) (120 days). The period may be reduced or extended (up to a total of 18
months). Bankruptcy Code § 1121(d). That limit on extensions was added in 2005; prior to that
time, there was no limit on possible extensions.
52 Bankruptcy Code § 1121(c)(3) (presumptive total of 180 days).
53 Bankruptcy Code §§ 1128, 1129.
54 Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
50
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invoke the absolute priority rule by voting against the plan.55 And, even then, the
resolution of that would turn on valuation issues (over the firm as a whole and over the
claims against the firm being issued) that were being resolved by a bankruptcy judge,
not by the market.
In the early years after the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978,
reorganization proceedings under Chapter 11, following these procedures and instincts,
were likely to be lengthy and driven by valuation disputes. The “exclusivity period”—
the period in which the debtor (in possession) had to file a plan of reorganization—was
routinely extended beyond 120 days, often to a period exceeding (sometimes greatly
exceeding) a year. Not only did delay—potentially advantageous to equity, just as it
was outside of bankruptcy56—continue, but the lack of resort to, or reliance on, marketvaluations meant that the bankruptcy judge was making the “live or die” valuation
decisions about whether a firm should continue or be liquidated and whether the firm’s
valuation included enough for a greater participation by creditors, or even equity.
Not surprisingly, faced with the role of potential executioner, bankruptcy judges
were inclined to be optimistic about going concern possibilities, and thus valuations.
Doing so had two salutary—from the perspective of the bankruptcy judge—benefits:
Participation rights could be extended so that more could be around to share in a
potential upside than otherwise, and the firm was “kept alive,” which clearly reduced
the (visible) stress on the workers, the suppliers, and the community that oftentimes
surrounded the bankruptcy judge. And these instincts were fueled by a long-standing
Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b).
Although, importantly, the decisions of the debtor in possession were now subject to judicial
oversight.
55
56
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notion that a goal of a bankruptcy reorganization was to “preserve jobs” (rather than—
or at least in addition to—finding the highest-and-best use of assets).57 Optimistic, nonmarket-driven valuations allowed this to occur, which often meant that the firm
ultimately failed to survive (although, of course, fortunes can change—it is a part of the
fundamental idea that valuations have upsides and downsides alike), but it meant that
the bankruptcy judge was not perceived as the executioner.
Moreover, when prominent bankruptcy decisions were perceived to be
destructive of jobs, or the rights of workers, Congress oftentimes stepped in with a fix,
to ensure that the rights of workers, and the focus on jobs, was not lost in bankruptcy.
Prominent examples of this include Section 1113, constraining the ability to reject
collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy58 and Section 1114, constraining the
ability to reduce retiree health care benefits in bankruptcy.59 In these cases, it would

This is an important part of the disagreement in the now-classic “debate” between Elizabeth
Warren and Douglas Baird in 1987 over the purposes of bankruptcy law, primarily in terms of its
role in deviating from nonbankruptcy priorities and entitlements. See Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1987); Douglas Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (1987). And it reflects, as
well, the reality that bankruptcy law has never been the pure produce of academic analysis, but has
always reflected the tugs and pulls of various political perspectives and groups. See David Skeel,
Debt’s Dominion, supra note 4, at 14-20.
58 Enacted in 1986, in response (primarily) to NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984)
(unilateral rejection under Bankruptcy Code § 365 of a collective bargaining agreement did not
violate the National Labor Relations Act).
59 Added in 1988 as a part of the Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, in response to
LTV Corp.’s termination of health and life insurance benefits of 78,000 retirees during its 1986
bankruptcy. See generally In re Visteon Corp., 612 F.3rd 216 (3rd Cir. 2010). The actions (or
decisions) that prompted these Congressional responses were not necessarily correct as a matter of
bankruptcy policy. There is a strong case to be made that the “attributes” of workers under a
collective bargaining agreement, in particular, are such that neither the firm, nor its creditors, can
unilaterally change the terms of those agreements during its life outside of bankruptcy. And, under
the principle that “attributes, not labels” control, first prominently given recognition in Chicago
Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924), the rejection of collective bargaining agreements in
bankruptcy may have been mistaken—just as the rejection of auto franchise agreements may have
been incorrect, given the nature of state franchise laws, in the recent bankruptcies of Chrysler and
General Motors. But our point isn’t the abstract “correctness” of the decisions, as a matter of
57
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be hard to argue with the perception that decisions that focused solely on the highestand-best use of assets were running headlong into other political and policy
considerations.
At almost the same time, efficiency considerations about the best use of assets
began to erode some of the formal structure and rules of Chapter 11, particularly in its
reliance on exclusivity periods, negotiation, and judicial “umpiring” over valuation.
Whether in response to creative lawyering, academic criticism, or judicial awareness—
or, very probably, all three—while the formal structure of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978
as it applied to reorganizations did not change in significant respects, practices
pursuant to it did.60 Creditors began to push for “going concern sales” of the firm—and
hence for market-based valuations of the assets of the firm. A general bankruptcy
provision, almost certainly originally thought to apply generally in Chapter 7 and to the
sale of stray, unwanted, assets in Chapter 11, began to be used in Chapter 11 as a
vehicle for the sale of the firm as a whole.61 Almost simultaneously—and indeed, in a
practical sense, related— lenders began to exert increasing control over the case by
including stringent covenants in their loan agreements with the debtor. Indirectly and
at times directly, these covenants effectively cut back on a debtor’s exclusivity period.
Together, these two changes had several dramatic effects. First and foremost,

bankruptcy law and policy, but the obvious Congressional response to decisions that were perceived
to be “worker unfriendly.”
60 See David Skeel, Debt’s Dominion, supra note 4, at 213 (“[l]aw-and-economics scholars and their
insights had remarkably little influence on the 1994 commission . . . but actual bankruptcy practice
has taken on many of the market-oriented characteristics that these scholars have advocated”).
61 The provision is Bankruptcy Code § 363, providing for the “use, sale, or lease of property” of the
estate. The major cases heralding the new era were In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2nd Cir. 1983)
and In re Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983).. See generally Douglas Baird, The New Face
of Chapter 11, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 69 (2004); Douglas Baird & Robert Rasmussen, The End
of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002).
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they severed the decision as to what to do with the assets from the fights over how to
distribute the value of those assets. The assets could now be sold early in a bankruptcy
process, even while some fights over the validity of claims or priorities had not yet been
resolved.62 Second, and equally importantly, they substituted judicial valuations of the
assets with market valuations. If the assets were worth more alive than dead, it was
expected that the market bids would reflect this.63 And, finally, without asset
valuations to fight about, there was no longer much room to argue about the impact of
the decision as to what to do with assets on workers or the community. A shift in
practice had accomplished what hard-edged legal rules seemed to have been unable to
accomplish.
2. The Lessons of Chrysler
But the story wasn’t finished, as the dramatic example of the 2009 Chrysler
bankruptcy reveals. For whatever reasons—natural political instincts to protect visible
and numerous jobs is probably reason enough to have prompted the bailout of crisis
without needing to get into more union-support-buying notions—the federal
government had a keen interest in preserving the jobs of Chrysler’s workers. We would
assert that the resulting Chrysler sale and reorganization “saved jobs,” but only in a
very perverse understanding of when, how, and why jobs are, or should be, preserved.

The Bankruptcy Code explicitly allow the assets to be sold “free and clear” of many, if not most,
claims. Bankruptcy Code § 363(f). For an argument that overriding doctrines of successor liability
may make sense under certain circumstances, see Thomas Jackson, Translating Assets and
Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. Legal. Studies 73, 94-97 (1985).
63 Although we generally applaud the increased use of sales, as is evident in the text, there may be
some grounds for concern when the debtor’s lender is also a potential buyer or insiders of the debtor
will move to the acquiring firm. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., An Efficiency-Based
Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. Chicago L. Rev. 425, 465-67
(2006).
62
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To understand our perspective, it is worth dropping back to the first Chrysler
bailout by the federal government from 1980, as the dynamics are clearer—although
they apply equally well to the Chrysler reorganization of 2009.64 In the first Chrysler
bailout, we were at a period in America where, through agreements brought about by
political pressure, Japanese automotive companies—virtually none of whom at that
time had U.S.-based plants—agreed by 1981 to “voluntarily” limit imports to the
American car market,65 and probably had begun do to so even earlier, in fear of the
political reaction in Washington, D.C. Demand for those Japanese cars was well-nigh
universally conceded to exceed that “voluntary” quota, which thus performed as an
artificial constraint on foreign supply. Given that, whether Chrysler lived or died in
the early 1980s, as a first approximation, affected not the number of domestic cars that
would be sold—something that was largely demand-driven—but which entity would sell
them.66 In a fixed-demand world, the more cars Chrysler sold, meant the fewer cars

The foundation for the 1980 Chrysler bailout was the passage of the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act
that gave a U.S. government guarantee to $1.5 billion in private loans to Chrysler. The loans carried
an interest rate of around 10%, which was approximately four percentage points below market at the
time, and the U.S. government received warrants for 14.4 million shares of Chrysler stock. In
addition, the loan guarantee statute required $2 billion in commitments or concessions from “owners,
stockholders, administrators, employees, dealers, suppliers, foreign and domestic financial
institutions, and by State and local governments.” Pursuant to pressure from the Treasury
Department, most of the concessions came from lenders. Chrysler was able to pay off nearly $600
million of debts at 30 cents on the dollar and it converted nearly $700 million of debts into a special
class of preferred stock. The essential public justification for the bailout was the savings of perhaps
as many of 200,000 U.S. jobs by keeping Chrysler afloat. See generally Barry Ritholtz, Bailout
Nation: How Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook the World Economy (2009);
The Heritage Foundation, “The Chrysler Bail-Out Bust,” at
www.heritage.org/research/reports/1983/07/the-chrysler-bail-out-bust.
65 See generally, Stephen Cohen, “The Route to Japan’s Voluntary Export Restraints on
Automobiles,” at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/scohenwp.htm.
66 There is a small “supply side” argument that Chrysler produced some cars that enhanced demand.
We set this aside, because it is both unlikely to be a significant factor in any case, as well as because
if Chrysler excelled at this dimension, it almost certainly wouldn’t have required a bailout in 1980!
64
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that were being sold by General Motors and Ford—the other two domestic automobile
producers of any consequence.67
Given this, it seems uncontroversial—which is different from saying that it was
clearly understood either then or now—that bailing Chrysler out in the early 1980s
meant that Chrysler sold more cars than otherwise, and General Motors and Ford,
fewer.68 Assuming that Chrysler was the least-efficient producer as of 1980 (which
seems reasonable in light of the 1970s—and even more so in hindsight), this story has
dramatically different implications when one starts from the efficient use of assets than
when one starts from a concern about jobs. From the perspective of the efficient use of
assets, rescuing Chrysler was a mistake. From this perspective, we want efficient
producers,69 which Chrysler wasn’t. Oligopoly concerns aside, you would want to shift
production from the inefficient Chrysler to the more efficient General Motors and Ford.
Chrysler would lose jobs (or close), but General Motors and Ford would presumably
increase employment (as well as purchases from suppliers) as they picked up the
market share previously held by Chrysler.
But this shift is exactly wrong if one’s starting point is “preserving jobs.”
Efficient producers usually are those who have figured out how to make something at
the lowest cost, which oftentimes implies equal outputs with fewer inputs—including
human capital inputs. If one’s highest priority is to “save jobs,” it means, rather

American Motors was still in existence, as was DeLorean Motor Company.
See Heritage Foundation, supra note 64 (“Chrysler has increased its market share not by making
inroads into foreign competition, but by taking customers away from other domestic
manufacturers”).
69 Here, we’re speaking relatively—among the “Big Three.” The reason for the import restrictions
was largely based on the enormous efficiencies of Japanese manufactures at this time, particularly
in terms of quality, over domestic manufacturers.
67
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perversely, throttling back on the efficient producer, and propping up the inefficient
producer. Moreover, the jobs that are “saved”—those of Chrysler—are highly
concentrated and visible, while the jobs that are “lost”—cutbacks by General Motors
and Ford—are harder to attribute to a single event (or to the government’s intervention
itself).70 A political focus on “jobs” has every incentive to favor the inefficient over the
efficient—which is dramatically at odds with the other recognized, and firmlyentrenched, bankruptcy policy about the efficient use of assets.
With this, we can now see clearly what occurred in Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcy
proceeding—albeit with some inexplicable “nodding” by the judiciary (until the final
Supreme Court action vacating all that had happened before).71 Chrysler, again almost
certainly the least efficient producer , was faced with extinction by the reality of a
market that was hugely overbuilt in terms of capacity. (Annual capacity for the U.S.—

Id. (“[u]nrepresented and unheard was a huge ‘invisible’ constituency [that] included current and
future laid-off Ford and General Motors workers, who never understood that their tax dollars were
being used to destroy their own jobs in order to save jobs at Chrysler”).
71 While the bankruptcy judge’s opinion permitting the sale under dubious procedures and
restrictions was affirmed in a hasty decision by the Second Circuit, In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108
(2d Cir. 2009) (argued on June 5, 2009, decided on June 5, 2009, with an opinion issued after-the-fact
on August 5, 2009—when its reasoning could hardly contradict its already-issued judgment), the
Supreme Court, on December 14, 2010, granted certiorari, vacated the Second Circuit’s opinion, and
directed that the Second Circuit dismiss the suit as moot. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v.
Chrysler LLC, 130 S.Ct. 1015 (2010). As a consequence, the Second Circuit’s opinion has no
precedential value. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950). This rather remarkable
step—since the Supreme Court in July had issued, and then lifted, a stay, following the Second
Circuit’s ruling (and prior to the Second Circuit’s written opinion justifying that ruling), allowing the
sale to be consummated, 129 S.Ct. 2275 (2009)—has led some to speculate that the Supreme Court’s
vacating the Second Circuit opinion six months after the Court lifted the stay allowing the sale to go
forward “was an expression of its disagreement with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the
requirements of § 363(b),” Fred David, Interpreting the Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Chrysler
Bankruptcy and its Impact on Future Business Reorganizations, 27 Emory Bankr. Developments J.
25, 27 (2010), found at http://www.law.emory.edu/fileadmin/journals/bdj/27/27.1/David.pdf. This is
plausible, since at the time the Supreme Court lifted the stay and allowed the transaction to be
consummated, the Second Circuit had not yet written its opinion explaining its reasons for affirming
the bankruptcy judge’s decision to allow the sale to go forward as then structured. When the Second
Circuit wrote its opinion, it is possible members of the Supreme Court realized its flaws and hence
took a later opportunity to vacate the opinion. Speculation, yes—but hopeful speculation!
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domestic and foreign—was running in excess of 17 million vehicles, while steady-state
demand, at least over the foreseeable future, looked as though it would be running
closer to 10-13 million vehicles. Pulling close to a quarter of capacity out of the system
was going to be painful, no matter how it occurred. Jobs were going to be lost. Dealers
were going to be shuttered. Suppliers and communities were going to feel the impact.)
Economic reality dictated that the question was not going to be “whether,” but “who.”
But—just as in the 1980s—the insistent political focus on “saving jobs” meant
rescuing the least efficient producer.72 Had Chrysler been liquidated, perhaps through
a sale of some or all of its assets to Fiat or another buyer, its then-existing secured
creditors (protected in a liquidation by the absolute priority rule) may well have done
better. In addition, the more efficient producers—Ford and others (now often with
U.S.-based plants)—would have continued, without the ancillary need for them to
reduce capacity (and jobs!) nearly as much as before. By saving Chrysler, the
government may well have saved jobs, but only in the Orwellian universe where it
make sense to punish the more efficient because they produce using fewer jobs than the
less efficient. The government saved Chrysler jobs—a concentrated and identifiable
group. To say that the government “saved jobs” overall both ignores the repercussions
felt by other manufacturers in responding to a reduction in demand (and capacity) from
17 million vehicles to 10-13 million vehicles, as well as to take credit for the jobs that

are saved by propping up the least efficient producer!

That it did so by almost certainly trashing bankruptcy priority rules along the way is a part of this
sad story. See Mark Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 727
(2009); see also http://www.scribd,com/doc/14952818/Objection-to-Chrysler-Sale-Motion (brief filed on
May 4, 2009 in the SDNY bankruptcy court by Chrysler’s non-TARP secured lenders).
72
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So, what does this story have to do with bankruptcy, and its role in economic
growth and recovery? The result in Chrysler’s 2009 bankruptcy occurred only because
the government strong-armed the bankruptcy process, and the judicial system didn’t
resist. But the story is deeper than this. The government’s intervention in Chrysler
can be seen as a direct response to the changes in practice that made it more plausible
to use market-valuations for Chrysler’s assets. Perhaps a going-concern sale that
played by neutral competitive bid rules would bring in less value than a sale of the Jeep
brand to one firm, the sale of various real estate owned by Chrysler to a variety of local
buyers, and the sale of one or two of Chrysler’s most efficient plants to other automotive
companies. But the government made it impossible to determine this. Even if the
judicial system wasn’t as slow as it seemed to be to respond to this abuse of bankruptcy
law and policy, the government may have had its way anyway. Most of the secured
lenders to Chrysler were the recipients of TARP funds. Whether through government
pressure on those lenders in that capacity, or through the various other hats that the
government wears (through Justice, the SEC, OSHA, the IRS, and numerous other
pressure points), it is a political reality that the government will have an enormous
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ability to shape outcomes,73 while claiming that it wasn’t a “bailout” but a justified
intervention to “save jobs.”74
We know of no effective response to this, other than transparency, and a belief
that the judicial system, more likely than not, ultimately will “get it right.” That
response may already be taking shape with respect to the 2009 Chrysler rescue. This is
particularly so in the context of current reorganization proceedings, where market sales
have become commonplace, and displacing judicial asset valuations. One can, and
should, insist on clear procedures that maximize bids—that insist on a true bidding
process. Recognizing the complexities of adequate information, the “lemon’s” problem,
and the “winner’s curse,”75 even so bidding procedures can go a long way towards
minimizing these problems, and at the same time, minimizing abuses of the process,
such as by artificial constraints on competing bids, which the government insisted upon
in Chrysler. Markets, and judicial oversight, cannot magically get everything right, but
the process can be set up in a way to maximize the possibilities that abuses will be
minimized. The question is not perfection, but alternatives. Given that the
alternatives to market valuations are judicial valuations or, it seems, government
intervention in one way or another, we believe that the focus should be on making the

See Mark Roe, “A Chrysler Bankruptcy Won’t Be Quick,” Wall Street J. May 1, 2009, at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124113528027275219.html (“Worse, there could be a legal fight over
whether the vote of Citibank and the other ‘big four’ creditors . . . , who together hold 70% of
Chrysler’s debt—should be counted toward the two-thirds threshold that would bind the company’s
other 42 creditors. The Bankruptcy Code requires that the votes of creditors be given in “good faith.”
It won’t be hard for the smaller creditors to argue that Citibank and other TARP recipient’s votes
aren’t in full good faith. In agreeing to Treasury’s offer of32 cents for each $1 of their debt, the
objectors would say, Citibank and some others were influenced by the fact that Treasury was
keeping them afloat with federal subsidies. If this type of litigation begins, it won’t be easily
resolved.”)
74 Precisely as occurred in the 1980 Chrysler bailout.
75 Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 63, at 465.
73
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market mechanisms as effective as possible, buttressed by judicial oversight and
review.
At the same time, the lessons from practice that have evolved away from the
1978 Bankruptcy Code’s envisioned structure—one of disclosure, voting, and judicial
umpiring—may also suggest that it is appropriate to streamline Chapter 11’s approval
rules so as to make them more amenable to a quick judicial reorganization rather than
an outright sale.76 Particularly when coupled with mandatory living wills, streamlined
procedures can both protect what needs to be protected while minimizing the use of
procedures for purposes of delay. While complex firms (particularly without prebankruptcy planning) may need the full exclusivity period,77 most firms with living
wills should need significantly less time.78 Moreover, competing plans—or the pressure
of possible competing plans—may go a long way towards reducing the use of Chapter 11
as a delaying mechanism, without needing to resort to going-concern sales under
Section 363.
Thus, especially if some of our earlier proposals were implemented, we would
favor reducing the exclusivity period significantly—to a presumptive 30 to 60 days—
which would both enhance pre-bankruptcy planning and add a dose (or threat) of
competition into the reorganization process, without necessarily resorting to Section
363 sales. We would likewise favor reducing the following solicitation and voting period
76

Some useful ideas are contained in Daniel Bussel & Kenneth Klee, Recalibrating Consent in

Bankruptcy, 83 Am. Bankr. L.J. 663 (2009).

Lehman Brothers filed its plan of reorganization on the last day of the statutorily-allowed 18
month exclusivity period. Of course, not only was Lehman Brothers extraordinarily complex, it had
done zero pre-bankruptcy planning.
78 Indeed, the increasing use of “pre-packs”—pre-packaged reorganization plans available as the firm
files—is already a significant step in confirming the direction we are proposing here as a matter of
statutory limits.
77
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to a presumptive additional 30 days. With streamlined disclosure and solicitation
rules, these proposals will go a long way towards making the original structure
contemplated in 1978 “competitive” again with the evolving practice towards marketbased sales.
Concluding Comments
Accomplishing a world in which bankruptcy maximized its contribution to
economic growth and recovery would be aided by a clear understanding that one can
only ask bankruptcy to do so much. If it is to allocate assets to their highest and best
use, it probably should not be asked, as a matter of an independent policy, to save jobs
as well. Rather, that concern should be the focus of other legal rules and government
policies, whose advantages and trade-offs are open and accessible, rather than hidden
in a complex, and (speaking politically) difficult to understand procedure. If the
government was to provide assistance (whether training grants or other forms of
economic assistance) to Chrysler workers who lose their jobs as a result of a liquidation
of Chrysler, that decision can be argued on its own merits. The irony of the failure to
do so is that the workers of the other auto manufacturing firms that inevitably lost jobs
as a result of the Chrysler bailout, never had the opportunity for a discussion about
similar assistance to them.
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